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Abstract
How does the rate at which ﬁrms adopt new technologies aﬀect the level of ed-
ucation and training of a country’s workforce? If technological change makes
knowledge obsolete and tends to foster general rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc skills,
what would be the optimum level of education spending in front of a faster
arrival of new technologies? This paper tries to answer these questions by de-
veloping an endogenous growth model with creative ’wear and tear’ in which
general education enhances innovation through R&D and lowers adjustment
costs to new technologies, while on-the-job training is necessary for ﬁrms to
realise their proﬁt potentials by implementing the new technologies and reap
all the related future quasi-rents. The paper reproduces some stylized facts
on the technology-training relationship and shows how the optimum amount
of time devoted to education and job training is aﬀected by the rate of tech-
nical change itself. In particular, we ﬁnd that a faster arrival of innovations
shifts the private knowledge portfolio towards general human capital. We
also ﬁnd that households tend to under invest in education, thus leading to
lower growth rates than technically feasible, and higher training costs than
absolutely necessary. This suggests that there is room for education policy
reducing private education fees.
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11 Introduction
During the last few decades we have witnessed the rise in the economic rele-
vance of the so called intangible resources, like school education, vocational
training, workplace learning and research and development. The process
of computerization and the diﬀusion of ICT in particular, have changed
the nature of work and transformed the types of knowledge, skills and atti-
tudes that individuals need for successful employment and work performance
(OECD, 2000; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002). Under the pres-
sure of ongoing technological progress and the spread of new work practices,
ﬁrms call upon specialized staﬀ and require individuals to acquire an ever
larger set of knowledge and competences. However, these individuals do not
necessarily do that at the beginning of their life or at school. With this
in mind, policy makers have identiﬁed a set of key generic skills that are
of particular importance, like motivation, communication skills, analytical
reasoning, IT and computer skills, problem-solving and ability to work in
teams.
There is ample evidence that generic skills are indeed increasing in im-
portance, both at the workplace and in the wage determination of workers
(Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Murnane, Willet, and Levy, 1995; Green,
Ashton, and Felstead, 2001; Gould, 2002; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003).
At the same time, the relative increase in the supply of more educated work-
ers in the industrialized countries has gone hand in hand with rising returns
to education. This puzzling phenomenon has been associated with the idea
that technological progress is intrinsically high-skilled biased.
The skill-biased technological change hypothesis has received extensive
attention from both economists and policy makers. In particular, since the
seminal contribution of Nelson and Phelps (1966), economists have put sub-
stantial eﬀorts in establishing that the introduction of a new technology
within a ﬁrm, or within an industry, is complementary to the employment
of a more educated workforce, who enjoys a comparative advantage in adapt-
ing to changing environments (Welch, 1970; Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987).
However, the relationship between the adoption of new technologies and
the performance of ﬁrms and economic systems is not obvious. Once a
new technology enters production, an adjustment process begins that in-
volves both physical capital costs, in terms of equipment set-up, and human
capital costs, in terms of workers learning (Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996;
2Bessen, 2002). Moreover, the link between skills and technological change
is two-sided. On the one hand, as the economics of technology diﬀusion has
stressed in particular, adjustment costs and the speed of technology adop-
tion are highly aﬀected by the skill distribution of the population (Goldin
and Katz, 1998, 2007). On the other hand, technological change does have
an inﬂuence on the human capital composition of the labour force, since it
can stimulate the demand for highly educated workers and/or depress the
demand for less qualiﬁed workers (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002; Autor, Katz, and
Krueger, 1998). But even though there is ample consensus on the impact of
technology on the demand for high-skilled workers, there is little evidence of
the mechanisms through which technology aﬀects the demand and the sup-
ply of diﬀerent types of human capital, speciﬁcally general education and
(technology) speciﬁc job-training.
As far back as the 1960s, labour economists have investigated the hetero-
geneous nature of human capital in determining the patterns of skill accu-
mulation within countries. Nonetheless, modern growth models do not seem
to take this heterogeneity suﬃciently into account. In particular, economic
theory does not seem to provide an unambiguous prediction of the sign of
the relationship between technological change and aggregate investment in
workplace training. The latter is the outcome of an ongoing interaction
between employers and workers, in which technological change aﬀects the
incentives for both parties (Bartel and Sicherman, 1998). In this respect,
one argument is that technological change makes formal education and pre-
viously acquired skills obsolete, thus increasing investments in speciﬁc train-
ing or experience and reducing the investments in general education (Tan,
1989; Weinberg, 2004). An alternative view is that general education en-
ables workers to adjust to and beneﬁt from technological change, so that
there are higher incentives to invest in schooling than in speciﬁc, on-the-job,
training (Welch, 1970; Gould, Moav, and Weinberg, 2001; Gould, 2002).
To sum up then, two main questions still remain unanswered. First, what
is the nature of the link between faster arrival of new technologies and the
human capital composition, particularly in terms of education and training,
of a country’s workforce? Second, what are the costs and beneﬁts of such
an accumulation of human capital and are they shared in such a way that
the most eﬃcient use is made of all (potential) human capital resources?
The present paper tries to shed some light on these questions by develop-
3ing an endogenous growth model in which the adoption of a new technology
is supposed to be costly for ﬁrms, since before that technology can be used
in production, the associated workers need to learn how to actually handle
it. When operating new technologies, we let speciﬁc skills, acquired through
on-the-job training, be imperfect substitutes for general education at the
workplace. We further endogenize the process of general knowledge accu-
mulation by making households decide upon their level of general education
in the context of the optimal allocation of their income derived from working
and the ownership of assets (ﬁrms in this case) over consumption and the
accumulation of assets and human capital. However, acquiring education
comes at an explicit cost for these private households (i.e. education fees).
There are a number of tradeoﬀs that are associated with education. First
of all, when a higher number of individuals in the economy gets educated,
that represents a signal to ﬁrms of a higher trainability of individuals, so
that ﬁrms can expect to beneﬁt from lower training costs and workers can
expect to beneﬁt from higher earnings proﬁles. Moreover, higher education
fosters R&D activity, thus increasing the production of new technologies.
On the other hand, higher education contributes to an increase in the rate
of creative destruction, thus forcing ﬁrms to provide more spells of speciﬁc
training on the job. At the same time, higher education intensities also
imply a drop in total working hours available for current production and
research activities and higher education expenditures by households at the
expense of private consumption expenditures.
The model we develop combines elements from Romer (1990), Aghion and
Howitt (1992) and the Ramsey (1928) model, so that productivity growth is
the result of ﬁrms’ ’Love of Variety’ and quality improvements in a context of
intertemporally optimal consumer decisions. From Romer (1990) we borrow
the idea that technological change is of an ’organizational’ nature and takes
the form of horizontal product diﬀerentiation. From Aghion and Howitt
(1992), instead, we take the idea that the arrival of new technologies drives
the old technologies out of the market, so that technological change takes
the form of vertical product diﬀerentiation with Schumpeterian creative de-
struction. However, in our model, the obsolescence of older intermediates
is not complete, but gradual, as in a ’creative wear and tear’ process where
all varieties live forever even if they gradually fade away over time (VanZon
and Yetkiner, 2003). To this basic set-up, we add the notion of the principal
4importance of heterogeneous human capital for economic growth, while we
use the Ramsey intertemporal optimisation framework, to endogenize the
households decision regarding the allocation of their resources over diﬀerent
activities, among which consumption and the accumulation of (general) hu-
man capital through a process of self-ﬁnanced education.
As opposed to previous work, in our setting it is technological change
that opens the possibility to have a mismatch between the skills acquired
by individuals and the skills to be used in the workplace when adopting the
newest technologies. In other words, technology is always ﬁrm speciﬁc, and
technological change generates new tasks that can only be performed after
the acquisition of speciﬁc skills on the job has been completed. In addition,
technological change aﬀects the rate at which human capital becomes obso-
lete: as a consequence, workplace training can increase or decrease at higher
rates of technological change.
In this model we show that education plays a threefold role in shaping
the technology-training relationship: (i) from the point of view of the ﬁrm,
a higher level of general skills available allows it to reap higher streams of
quasi-rents because of lower training costs; (ii) from the R&D-sector’s point
of view, a higher level of education fosters the invention of new technologies,
thus increasing the rate of obsolescence of speciﬁc skills at the workplace;
(iii) from households’ point of view, higher education signals a higher train-
ability and, thus, a higher expected future earnings capacity once matched
to the new task. However, being educated requires time and therefore gen-
erates opportunity costs in terms of consumption foregone.
The present paper also diﬀers from previous ones since it considers time
as the main unit of measure for describing each activity and each trade-oﬀ.
Human capital accumulation through school education, job training and
R&D, thus, is supposed to be a time-consuming process and our main aim
is to show how the sectors of the economic system optimally adjust their
allocation of time in response to the arrival of new technologies.
The paper achieves some important results. First, it reproduces the
mixed ﬁndings regarding the relationship of substitutability/complementarity
between general education and speciﬁc training. Second, it shows that, in
time of rapid accumulation of new technologies, ﬁrms change the optimum
time ’portfolio-mix’ between general education and speciﬁc training in favour
of the former, since it provides a relatively solid basis for the development
5of technology-speciﬁc skills that are prone to creative destruction.
The paper is further structured as follows. Section 2 surveys endogenous
growth models dealing with technology adoption and education/training.
Section 3 describes the main features of our model, while section 4 presents
some simulation results. Finally section 5 provides the main conclusions and
policy implications.
2 Background Literature
Our model links the labour economics literature on education and training
with the endogenous growth literature on R&D and human capital forma-
tion as the primary cause of productivity growth.
While there is ample theoretical and empirical research on the relation-
ship between technology use and the skill level of workers by education
and/or occupational category, the relationship between technological change
and the human capital composition of the labour force is not clear-cut. When
a new technology is introduced into a production process, the ﬁrm may incur
large technology-speciﬁc adjustment costs because of the need to learn new
skills, implementing new organizational forms, or developing complemen-
tary capital investments. Bessen (2002), for instance, estimates that capital
adoption costs for US manufacturing industries rose by over 4% of GDP in
the 1970s and 1980s, this pattern being particularly signiﬁcant in the period
in which information technologies and computers diﬀused more rapidly. In
addition, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) estimate that learning costs as
a share of GDP increased by 1.5% in the 1970s, together with a substantial
rise in wage inequality. On the third aspect, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000)
and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) ﬁnd that organizational in-
vestments can be considerably larger than the investments in IT equipment
itself.
The literature on skill-biased technological change (SBTC) has always
pointed to a positive relationship between technological change, i.e. particu-
larly in the form of computerization or ICT diﬀusion, and the skill upgrading
of workers. Sector- or plant-level analyses generally ﬁnd a robust relation-
ship between the change in the share of skilled workers employed and the
use of technology at the level of a single industry (Berndt, Morrison, and
Resenblum, 1992; Berman, Bound, and Griliches, 1994; Autor, Katz, and
6Krueger, 1998; Haskel and Heden, 1999), or at the level of a single ﬁrm
(Dunne and Schmitz, 1995; Doms, Dunne, and Troske, 1997; Entorf and
Kramarz, 1997; Dunne, Haltiwanger, and Troske, 1997; Dunne and Troske,
2005).
When we look at the close relationship between technology and training,
instead, there is only little evidence available. However, it does tell us that,
although faster technological change requires more workers to be trained
and perhaps more frequently so Lillard and Tan (1986); Gill (1988); Bresna-
han, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002); Galia and Legros (2004), the duration
of training (which is measured as the average training time required to be-
come fully qualiﬁed in the current job) need not be longer (Mincer, 1989).
Moreover, little is said on the interaction between general education human
capital and speciﬁc training human capital in a context characterized by
fast technical change. From Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970) and
Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987), we know that highly educated individuals
tend to adopt innovations sooner compared to less educated individuals,
since the former enjoy a comparative advantage in adapting to change and
in implementing new and more complex non-manual tasks (Autor, Levy,
and Murnane, 2003; Spitz, 2003). Nevertheless, how technological change
ultimately aﬀects training investments for workers with diﬀerent levels of
education is still largely unknown territory.
According to the little evidence available (Tan, 1989; Bartel and Sicher-
man, 1998): (i) the incidence of training is higher at higher rates of techno-
logical change; (ii) the more educated individuals are more likely to receive
ﬁrm training, but technical change tends to remove this eﬀect as the training
gap between highly educated and less educated narrows; (iii) when a new
technology is ﬁrst introduced, the general skills of highly educated workers
act like a substitute for ﬁrm training. As experience with the new technology
is gained, then it is possible to train less educated employees in performing
new tasks; (iv) the net eﬀect of technological change on training human
capital is obsolescence, whereas the net eﬀect on schooling human capital is
an increase in productivity.
At the macroeconomic level, our model is in line with previous work by
Acemoglu (1997), Helpman and Rangel (1999), Galor and Moav (2000) and
Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2001). In this respect, a number of contribu-
tions study the direct impact of the adoption of a new technology on the
7human capital composition of workers, even if, generally speaking, the focus
of these analyses is on the relationship between technology and the increas-
ing wage inequality that characterizes advanced economies.
After the seminal paper by Grossman and Helpman (1991), works by
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000),
Aghion, Howitt, and Violante (2002), Violante (2002) and Weinberg (2004),
for instance, have focused on the eﬀect that the adoption of a new general
purpose technology exerts on the skill premium and on labor productivity.
In these models, more educated, and thus more skilled, individuals have
a comparative advantage since the time required to learn how to use new
technologies diminishes with the level of knowledge that workers have accu-
mulated in the past. The need for a skilled labour force is then particularly
perceived at the beginning of the adoption phase, when returns from adop-
tion are more uncertain, whereas, as the technology becomes established, the
production process becomes standardised, thus allowing producers to sub-
stitute away from expensive high-skilled labour to less expensive unskilled
labour.
Helpman and Rangel (1999), instead, show that technological change re-
quiring more education and training, like computerization and ICT diﬀusion,
necessarily produces an initial productivity slowdown, whereas technological
change requiring less education and training, like the move from the artisan
shop to the factory and the assembly line, can produce either a boom or a
bust.
Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2001) argue that, when technological progress
occurs, individuals ask for general education since it guards against the
higher depreciation risk associated with technology speciﬁc skills. Faster
technological change, then, is correlated with higher amounts of investments
in technology-speciﬁc skills by less educated workers because they suﬀer from
higher rates of obsolescence as compared to highly educated workers.
Our model is also in line with recent work by Krueger and Kumar (2004),
who postulate that economic systems that provide a relatively intensive pol-
icy support for vocational education, like the European Union, will grow
slower than systems favouring general education, like the US, when the ar-
rival rate of new technologies accelerates.
83 The Model
3.1 General Outline
The model that we present here tries to answer two broad questions. The
ﬁrst is how the optimal accumulation of general versus speciﬁc skills would
change when the rate of technological change does change. The second ques-
tion is whether the allocation of time over education and other uses of time
is the most eﬀective in generating growth.
While trying to answer these questions, the model will also be required to
address/reproduce two stylized facts. The ﬁrst concerns the relative increase
in importance of general skills as a source of growth with respect to speciﬁc
skills in times of fast technological change (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999;
Lindbeck and Snower, 2000b; Green, Ashton, and Felstead, 2001; Stasz,
2001; Gould, 2002; Spitz, 2003). Based on this, we would expect there to
be a premium on formal education rather than speciﬁc training in times of
rapid technological change. However, we would also expect that an increase
in the formal level of education could even result in a reduction of output
growth because of the increase in ’technology absorption costs’ in terms of
output foregone during re-training spells that arrive at a faster rate, but
may take a shorter time.
The second stylised fact concerns the mixed nature of the relationship
between general and speciﬁc training by showing conditions under which
the two types of human capital act like substitutes and the conditions un-
der which they behave like complements (Gill, 1988; van Smoorenburg and
van der Velden, 2000; Allen and der Velden, 2001; Brunello, 2001; Heijke,
Meng, and Ris, 2003).
In our set-up, the economy consists of four production sectors and a
household sector that interact with each other. The educational sector is
responsible for the production of general education, while the R&D sector
generates new technologies, and, ﬁnally, the ﬁnal output production sector
generates consumption goods using intermediate goods produced by the in-
termediate goods sector. The model furthermore incorporates three types
of temporal trade-oﬀs: (i) human capital production versus immediate par-
ticipation on the labour market; (ii) technology versus intermediate goods
production; (iii) training versus current production. To start with, house-
holds should choose between spending time at school for the accumulation of
9human capital and going to work. The production of human capital further
requires people in the economy to allocate time to teaching.
The decision to spend time on non-educational activities is governed by
the second trade-oﬀ that concerns spending time to develop new technolo-
gies through R&D or entering production and spending time to manufacture
intermediates, that in turn give rise to the ﬂow of ﬁnal goods used for con-
sumption purposes.
Finally, the third trade-oﬀ occurs at the level of the production process
and involves the choice of the ﬁrm between accumulating the necessary spe-
ciﬁc skills through training in order to be able to adopt the latest technology
- and reap all the related future earnings - or starting production sooner
rather than later by employing low-skilled labour instead of well-trained
labour.
To summarise the above, in the model we distinguish between knowledge
acquired (by households), knowledge required (for the production of the in-
termediates incorporating the new technology) and knowledge used (in the
actual production of the ﬁnal good, after the accumulation of technology-
speciﬁc skills on the job, and in R&D activity). The model starts from the
assumption that the introduction of a new technology requires the users
to learn how to use it eﬀectively. In order to do that, the workforce as-
sociated with a new technology needs to be trained ﬁrst1. During their
training period, workers earn a competitive wage, since they are assumed
to be indiﬀerent between working (and so ’earning their keep’) and training
(thus learning to ’earn their keep’ later on). However, they do not produce
anything, thus giving rise to an opportunity cost for the ﬁrm in terms of
output forgone. Therefore, the total cost of training includes both the direct
wage cost and the opportunity cost of foregone output. The beneﬁts from
training, instead, are an increased productivity later on during the produc-
1In the model we do not directly focus on mechanisms like ’learning by doing’ (Arrow,
1962; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996) or ’experience’ (Rosen, 1972; Helpman and Rangel,
1999; Weinberg, 2004) for two reasons: ﬁrst, we want to observe how the adoption of new
technologies aﬀects the human capital composition of employees at the beginning of the
working process, in order to avoid a situation in which the market activity entails a joint
production of learning plus production. Secondly, we are interested in predicting how
ﬁrms’ and households’ investments decisions change with the arrival of new intermediates,
and both school education and on-the-job training represent two types of investment in
human capital in which it is easier to identify monetary (other than opportunity) costs
and beneﬁts. For a theoretical synthesis of the discussion around the diﬀerence between
learning by doing, experience, and training see Killingsworth (1982).
10tion phase of a technology, which enables the entrepreneur to economize on
wage-costs during that phase. Training, therefore, generates cost-reductions
in the future in return for current cost-increases.
Since we assume that there is no production while training, it follows
immediately that a model with complete creative destruction of old tech-
nologies through the arrival of new ones is less suited for our purposes, since
it would generate ’odd’ growth patterns that can not be observed in real-
ity. For, in such a creative destruction setting, the arrival of a new superior
technology would lead to a zero level of output, while the workforce is re-
trained to be used with the new technology. Instead, an approach in which
new technologies do not fully replace old ones, but gradually drive them
out of the market seems to be more suited. This is the ’creative wear and
tear eﬀect’ also used in VanZon and Yetkiner (2003): in such a ’Love of
Variety’ set-up, old technologies never die, but simply become less impor-
tant and therefore less used with the progress of time. This creative ’wear
and tear’ continuously and gradually releases labour resources that can be
re-employed by the new ﬁrms created with the aim of using the new tech-
nologies that arrive on the market.
In the labour market, general skills play a double role: on the one hand,
they increase labour productivity of workers in the production of new tech-
nologies, while on the other hand, they are supposed to raise the eﬃciency of
the acquisition of further technology-speciﬁc skills at the workplace as they
increase ’workers absorptive capacity’ (Lloyd-Ellis, 1999) and, thus, reduce
technology absorption costs. Particularly when a mismatch between skills
required by new tasks and skills acquired by workers arises, an investment
in speciﬁc training reduces this gap, so that lower levels of formal education
can be compensated by higher investments in on the job training and vice
versa.
We assume that general skills are acquired by individuals through school-
ing. While job training is entirely ﬁnanced by ﬁrms, we assume that house-
holds pay for acquiring higher levels of general education. The accumulation
of human capital through education provides individuals with a higher train-
ability on the labour market, and therefore higher wages once employed. To
obtain these expected returns, households face a double cost: a direct ﬁnan-
cial cost, given by the fee they need to pay in order to ﬁnance educational
activities (i.e. both teaching and learning), and an opportunity cost in the
11form of wage income foregone while being educated.
Technological change, ﬁnally, is the result of R&D activity. Following
Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), the knowledge contained
in new blueprints is embodied into new intermediate goods that, in turn,
give rise to the production of a single ﬁnal good that serves as the consump-
tion good in our model economy. We further assume that the production
and accumulation of blueprints depends positively on the number of hours
spent in R&D, and on the productivity of researchers (in part deﬁned by
their educational level).
In short, our model therefore contains four production sectors in the
model, i.e. the education sector, the intermediate goods sector, the ﬁnal
output sector and the R&D sector. There are two institutional sectors, i.e.
private households and ﬁrms. Firms have to decide on hiring inputs in order
to be able to produce their output, while households have to decide how to
spend their time on diﬀerent activities: learning and the supply of labour
to the diﬀerent sectors. We will ﬁrst describe how the education sector is
supposed to work, before describing how consumers are supposed to allo-
cate their time. In the following subsections we describe how production
and training as well as R&D decisions are made.
3.2 Education
We assume that individuals acquire general knowledge by spending time
and income in the educational system. By assumption, schooling is a time-
consuming activity that is a substitute for working activity and that involves
not only pupils but also teachers, so that total time allocated to the educa-
tion system is split between time spent learning and time spent teaching:
H = (HL + HT) + HW (1)
where H is the total time available for the entire population, and where
HL is the amount of time that an individual spends at school acquiring
general education, while HT is teaching time; HW is the total time devoted
to working activities, either in direct production or in R&D. HL + HT is
the total amount of time taken-up by the educational system. Deﬁning
ϕ = HL/H, and ψ = HT/H, i.e. ϕ is the fraction of time spent learning
by the population at large, and ψ is the fraction of time devoted by the
12population to teaching, we further assume that both the schooling intensity
ϕ and the number of teaching hours per pupil hour, i.e. ψ/ϕ, will contribute
positively to the build-up of the level of general human capital per person
:
 = ζ0 · ϕζ1 · (HT/HL)ζ2 = ζ0 · ϕζ1−ζ2 · ψζ2 (2)
where we reasonably assume ζ0 > 0 and ζ1 > ζ2 > 0 in order for both
schooling and teaching to have a positive eﬀect on the level of human capital
per person.
As regards the cost-side of education, we assume that households have to
devote part of their income to ﬁnance the teaching activity that is necessary
for increasing . Households’ decisions, therefore, concern the choice between
consumption, income from working and the accumulation of human capital
in order to beneﬁt from higher future wages on the labour market.
With respect to teaching, we assume that the cost of teaching per unit of
pupil time (further called f which is short for teaching ’fee’), depends on the
number of teaching hours per pupil hour and the hourly wage of teachers.
Assuming that teachers earn a competitive hourly wage, we must have that
the teaching cost per pupil hour is given by:
f = w · (HT/HL) = w · ψ/ϕ. (3)
With regard to the productivity eﬀects of education, we simply assume
that the production eﬃciency of labour will depend positively on both hu-
man capital per person and the amount of training received per person, as
proxied by the length of the training period s.
π(s,) = γ0 · s1−γ1 · γ1. (4)
Equation (4) is a simple linear homogenous power-function in which we
assume that 0 < γ1 < 1, and ∂π/∂s > 0,∂π/∂ > 0. Equation (4) shows
that a constant level of worker eﬃciency can be attained for diﬀerent com-
binations of s and , where a decreasing value of s must be compensated by
an ever increasing value of  in order to keep worker eﬃciency constant, and
vice-versa. Hence, at the micro-level, education and training are assumed
to be (imperfect) substitutes.
If we take ω to signal wages per eﬃciency unit of labour, wages per
(physical) unit of labour time are simply the product between eﬃciency per
13labourer and ω, giving (after substitution of (2)):
w = π(s,) · ω = γ0 · ζ
γ1
0 · s1−γ1 · ϕγ1·(ζ1−ζ2) · ψγ1·ζ2 · ω. (5)
Equation (5) shows that our assumption that ζ1 > ζ2 implies that, ceteris
paribus, hourly wages will depend positively on both pupil and teaching time
spent in the educational system.
3.3 The Time Allocation Problem of Private Households
The problem of households is to maximize the stream of utility derived from
a consumption stream that itself depends on the allocation of time between
work on the one hand, and education and teaching on the other. With
respect to the latter, we simply assume that consumers are indiﬀerent as to
where they work 2.
In order to solve this allocation problem, we use the Ramsey approach,
where we accumulate assets (reﬂecting the ownership of blueprints/ﬁrms)
rather than physical capital. The stock of assets make up the wealth of
households, further called W.
Using c to denote the ﬂow of consumption per capita, the accumulation
of wealth is given by 3:
˙ W = r · W + w · (HW + HT) − f · HL − c · H. (6)
Assuming a standard CIES-utility function, the corresponding Hamil-
tonian is given by:
Ω = e−ρ·t · (c1−θ/(1 − θ) · H + λ · ˙ W = e−ρ·t · (c1−θ/(1 − θ) · H+
λ · (r · W − c · H + ω · π(s,) · (1 − ψ − ϕ) · H)
(7)
where ρ represents the constant rate of discount and λ is the co-state variable
of this intertemporal utility maximisation problem. Note that we have used
(3) and (5) to arrive at (7). In this problem, only c,ψ and ϕ are variables
that are under the control of consumers. Maximising the Hamiltonian with
respect to these controls, we ﬁnd that:
∂Ω/∂ϕ ⇒ ϕ = γ1 · (ζ1 − ζ2)/(1 + γ1 · (ζ1 − ζ2)) · (1 − ψ) (8a)
2Note that this implies that all production sectors have to oﬀer the same wage rate,
otherwise a sector would be oﬀered all labour available or none at all.
3A dot over a variable x denotes the time derivative of x, i.e.˙ x = dx/dt. Furthermore
we will be using a hat over a variable to denote the proportional rate of growth of that
variable, i.e. ˆ x = ˙ x/x.
14∂Ω/∂ψ ⇒ ϕ = 1 − (1 + γ1 · ζ2)/(γ1 · ζ2) · ψ (8b)
∂Ω/∂c ⇒ ˆ c = (−ˆ λ − ρ)/θ = (r − ρ)/θ (8c)
∂Ω/∂W = −˙ λ ⇒ ˆ λ = −r (8d)
It should be noted that (8a) and (8b) both imply a trade-oﬀ between
learning and teaching time. Simultaneously, however, they ﬁx the amount
of learning and teaching time, independently of the other parameters of the
model, particularly those associated with the R&D production process4.
The simultaneous solution for ϕ and ψ is given by:
ϕ∗ = γ1 · (ζ1 − ζ2)/(1 + γ1 · ζ1) (9a)
ψ∗ = γ1 · ζ2(1 + γ1 · ζ1) (9b)
Equations (9a) and (9b) both imply that teaching time and learning time
will depend positively on γ1 if indeed ζ1 > ζ2 > 0, implying that a higher
elasticity of labour eﬃciency with respect to human capital (i.e. γ1 in equa-
tion (4)) will lead to a rise in the allocation of time to learning and teaching.
Yet, the ratio of these optimum values of learning and teaching time is inde-
pendent of the characteristics of the eﬃciency function, but instead depends
only on those of the human capital accumulation function as given by (2).
A higher contribution of teaching hours per pupil hour as given by ζ2, would
indeed increase teaching hours relative to pupil hours, and the other way
around. Similarly, if the elasticity of human capital formation with respect
to pupil hours (i.e. ζ1) increases, then ϕ∗ will increase too, while ψ∗ will
fall. The implication of this is that for groups of countries that would diﬀer
with respect to these parameters ζ1 and ζ2 learning and teaching hours will
be negatively correlated, while for groups of countries that would diﬀer with
respect to γ1, learning and teaching hours will be positively correlated.
4Obviously, this is due to our assumption that consumers are well informed about the
direct productivity eﬀects of their educational decisions, but ignore the growth eﬀects that
these decisions may have through their impact on R&D productivity (we will come back
to this in the section covering the R&D sector). A central planner would also take these
growth eﬀects into account, leading to a diﬀerent allocation of time between education
and other eﬀorts and to higher growth, as we will show in section 4.
153.4 The Production Set
3.4.1 Preliminaries
The production sector is organised along the lines of Romer (1990), except
that it does not use physical capital, but just human capital services to pro-
duce intermediates that, together with a freely available ﬁxed factor, go into
making the ﬁnal output. This set-up makes for a production structure that
is separable in the intermediates just as in the Romer model. This separabil-
ity signiﬁcantly reduces the complexity of the model. We use the assumption
of full employment of human capital to obtain the supply of labour available
for work in either intermediate goods, ﬁnal goods or blueprint production
as the diﬀerence between total time available and time spent in the edu-
cational sector. We will go into the supply of labour in somewhat greater
detail below.
As regards the decision how much labour to supply for R&D purposes,
that depends on the equilibrium wage rate in the R&D sector, that, just
like in the Romer (1990) model, depends on discounted proﬁts generated in
intermediate goods production. Those proﬁts can be captured by the R&D
sector, since it is the ownership of the corresponding blueprint that actually
allows the owner to claim the associated proﬁt stream. Transfer of that
ownership will take place only if the original owner, i.e. the R&D sector,
will be suﬃciently compensated for the loss of his claim. In the limit, that
compensation will have to be equal to the value of the claim, which is what
Romer (1990) and we have assumed. In the remainder of this section, we
will describe the features of the production sectors in more detail.
3.4.2 Production Labour Suppy Issues
We assume that the size of the population remains ﬁxed over time. At the
same time it constantly needs education, as we would expect it to occur
in real life too due to the fact that older (educated) generations die, and
the youngest are born with a clean educational slate. We will (somewhat
superﬁcially) model this by assuming that at any time just a fraction 0 ≤
(1 − ϕ − ψ) ≤ 1 of the population is available for ﬁnal output production
and R&D activities, whereas the complement of that fraction, i.e. ϕ+ψ, is
tied up in the education process. Given the above, we must have that:
HW = (1 − ϕ − ψ) · H = HR + HP (10)
16Equation (10) describes the supply of production labour time as the com-
plement of the amount of time spent in the educational system. It also states
that the part of the population that is not in the educational system is ei-
ther engaged in R&D activities (HR) or in direct production activities (HP),
while HP itself is in part engaged in training (T) and in production (J):
HP = T + J (11)
Equations (10) and (11) reﬂect the assumption that the labour market is
always clearing, and so there is no unemployment pool that absorbs excess
supply. Equation (10) also indicates that educated high-skilled R&D labour
is a perfect substitute for high-skilled production labour, and the other way
around.
3.4.3 Final Output Production and Intermediate Goods Demand
Final output is produced under perfectly competitive circumstances, by as-
sembling the intermediate outputs coming from the intermediate goods sec-
tor using only a ﬁxed factor, further called L. To simplify matters, we
assume that L is equal to 1 and furthermore that it is freely available to the
ﬁnal output sector. We use an Ethier function to describe this ﬁnal output
production process:




In equation (12), Y is ﬁnal output, B is the index of the latest technology
that has entered the production phase, and xi is the volume of intermediate
output associated with production technology i. (1−α) is the partial output
elasticity of the freely available ﬁxed factor, while σ = 1/(1 − α) > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution between intermediates.
The demand for each individual intermediate good by the ﬁnal output
sector then follows immediately from the assumption of instantaneous proﬁt
maximisation under conditions of perfect competition:
pi = L1−α · α · (xi)α−1,0 ≤ i ≤ B (13)
where the price of ﬁnal output is used as the numeraire. Equation (13) is
the inverse demand equation for intermediates: still as in Romer (1990), it
will function as a supply constraint for the producers of intermediate goods.
173.4.4 Intermediate Goods Supply and Labour Demand
For reasons of simplicity, we assume a linear production technology so that
the production of one unit of each intermediate good requires the use of one
eﬃciency unit of high-skilled labour. Eﬃciency units of labour used in the
production of xi are called hi. We therefore have:
hi = xi,∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ B (14)
As already described above, we assume that one physical unit of labour
associated with technology i (further called ji) can generate π(s,) eﬃciency







,∀ 0 ≤ i ≤ B (15)
where the level of intermediate goods production is given by (13).
The corresponding demand for labour in physical units can immediately
be obtained by substituting (14) and (15) into (13):
ji = L · (pi/α)−σ/π(s,) (16)
Equation (16) represents the derived demand for labour for each inter-
mediate goods producing ﬁrm, given the price it sets for its intermediate.
3.4.5 Quasi-Rents Maximization in Intermediate Goods Produc-
tion
The price setting behaviour referred to above, together with the behaviour
that determines how long the training period s should be, can be formulated
as the solution to the problem of maximising the net present value of the
ﬂow of quasi-rents that can be obtained by hiring a population of workers,
training them for s time-units, and then using these trained workers to gen-
erate output that is sold conditional on the inverse demand curve given by
(13) and its expected evolution over time. For, as we will show later on, in
a situation of steady state growth, wages may be expected to grow equally
steadily, and therefore prices (being set using a mark-up over marginal costs)
can be expected to grow steadily too.
Because of the symmetry between intermediate goods ﬁrms (all ﬁrms
have the same production technologies and contribute in the same way to
ﬁnal output), the training period s will be the same for all new ﬁrms too.
18Hence, wages will be the same for each ﬁrm as well. We assume furthermore
that wages oﬀered to trainees are the same as those for high-skilled workers
associated with ﬁrms that are in their production phase already. The struc-
ture outlined above has been depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The Evolution over Time of Labour Demand
In Figure 1, the demand for labour to produce an intermediate invented
at time t = 0 is depicted for all moments in time after t = 0, for a given and
constant growth rate of the wage rate. An intermediate will be produced
after a training phase of duration s. During that phase, the wage rate is
assumed to rise at a given proportional rate, and consequently (see equation
(17) and (19) further below) the demand for labour at time t > s that is
associated with the intermediate invented at time t = 0, i.e. jt , will fall.
However, it would be a waste of resources to train more workers than would
actually be needed from the start of the production phase at time s, hence
a rational entrepreneur would hire only js workers to be trained during the
training phase of the intermediate.
Figure 1 is formalised as follows. The net present value of the expected
ﬂow of quasi-rents (further called Q) for a ﬁrm that has bought the latest














where ρ is the rate of discount, and wT is the expected wage rate per physical
unit of labour at time T (T > s)5. In equation (17), where we have used (14)
5Note that we have dropped the technology subscripts, because the symmetry of (4) and
19to replace high-skilled labour demand by the demand for intermediates, the
ﬁrst integral describes the ﬂow of quasi-rents, since labour is the only factor
of production. That ﬂow starts only after the training-phase has ended and
the production-phase has begun. The training-phase takes s units of time.
During the training-phase, js physical units of labour need to be trained,
since that is the amount of labour needed when the production-phase starts.
There are training costs involved, and the present value of these costs is given
by the second integral in (17).
The intermediate goods producer now has two independent controls to
be determined. The ﬁrst one is the Q-maximising price of intermediates,
and the second one is the Q-maximising length of the training period s.
It should be noted that equation (17) can be maximised with respect to
the price of intermediates only for the future in as far as it refers to the
















which is the familiar Amoroso-Robinson price-setting rule, where  = −σ =
−1/(1 − α) is the price-elasticity of the demand for intermediates (see also
equation (15)) and where marginal costs are wage costs per eﬃciency unit
of labour7.
In order to ﬁnd the Q-maximising value of s, we have to use Leibniz’s
rule for diﬀerentiating integrals, since the bounds of both integrals in (17)
depend on s. We therefore get the ﬁrst-order condition:
∂Q
∂s = 0 =
h


















The ﬁrst term of (19) within curly brackets is the present value of the loss
in quasi-rents that occurs by extending the training-phase by 1 unit of time
(marginal opportunity cost of training). The second term is the present
value of the additional training costs for a given number of trainees associ-
ated with a marginal increase in s (total marginal training costs). The third
(5) implies that the net present value problem is essentially the same for all intermediate
goods producers.
6The price of a good that is not produced and therefore not sold can hardly be regarded
as a control.
7See Aghion and Howitt (1992)
20term is the present value of the increase in total training costs for a change
in the number of required trainees that could be expected to occur if the
production phase starts one unit of time later, i.e. if the training-phase is
extended by one unit of time (marginal direct cost of training)8. The ﬁnal
term represents the present value of the beneﬁts from extra training (mar-
ginal training beneﬁt), since these would increase labour productivity and
hence decrease production costs for the entire duration of the production
phase. Equation (19), therefore, represents the equality condition between
marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of additional training.
Using these results, we will now obtain the allocation of time over train-
ing and working in intermediate goods production.
3.4.6 Training and Working in Intermediate Goods Production
In order to be able to derive the distribution of time over all its diﬀerent
uses, we focus on the steady state. Assuming steady state growth in A at
a proportional rate ˆ A, we should have that the latest intermediate that is
actually in the production phase must be the intermediate that has just
ended the training phase of length s. Let B(t) be the latest innovation, i.e.
the blueprint index of the marginal intermediate just entering the production
phase at time t. In that case we must have that:
B(t) = A(t − s) = A(t) · e
ˆ A·s (20)
Since each intermediate good enters the production function symmetri-
cally, we must have that the demand for labour in the production phase is
the same for each intermediate. Hence, the demand for all labour in the
production phase must be given by:
J(t) = B(t) · j(t) = A(t) · e( ˆ A·s) · L · (w(t)/π(s,)α)−σ · α2σ (21)
where j(t) represents the number of production workers active on each in-
termediate with index less than or equal to B(t) and where A(t) is again
the index of the newest technology at time t and B(t) is the index of the
8Indeed, as we will show later on, technical change leads to a continuous upward
pressure on wages, and hence to a continuous downward adjustment of the demand for
labour. So, by extending the training period, one would normally need less people to train
because of the anticipated fall in the demand for labour per technology over time in the
steady state.
21newest intermediate that has just entered the production phase.
Because of technical change, we ﬁnd that, according to equation (21), the
demand for labour would grow as fast as A(t) itself, ceteris paribus. For a
given level of supply of production labour, this implies that the wage rate
is driven up to maintain equilibrium between the demand for production
labour and the given supply of production labour. In fact, taking logarith-
mic time derivatives of (21), while assuming J(t) to be constant, we ﬁnd
that the steady state growth rate of wages must be equal to:
ˆ w = ˆ A/σ = ˆ A · (1 − α) (22)
This positive growth in wages implies that the demand for labour would
drop both for intermediates in the production phase, but more importantly,
also for labour in the training phase, since we have assumed that workers
engaged in technology-speciﬁc training must be oﬀered a competitive wage,
i.e. the same wage as that of workers in the production phase. However,
if the wage rate is expected to rise during the training phase because A(t)
grows, then the cost-eﬃcient amount of labour to hire for the newest inter-
mediate with index A(t) at time t would be j(t + s), since that is exactly
the amount of production labour that will need to become active after the
training phase on intermediate with index has passed.
Let tC be the moment in time when the intermediate with index C has
been invented. Then, in a situation of steady state growth, and assuming
A(0) = 1, we must have that:
C = e
ˆ A · tC ⇔ tC = Log(C)/ ˆ A (23)
So, equation (23) deﬁnes the steady state arrival time of the newest tech-
nology with index C9. Furthermore, the demand for labour during the
training phase would be equal to the number of workers that would be op-
timal at the time the production phase of intermediate C commences. This
amount of labour for intermediate C is given by (cf. (21)):
j(t)(tC + s) = L · [w(tC + s)/π(s,)α]
−σ · α2σ (24)
where w(tC +s)is the expected wage rate at the time intermediate C would
enter the production phase. For a given and constant growth rate of wages
9Consequently, since A(t) has been deﬁned as the index of the newest technology at
time t, we must have that tA = t. Hence, by deﬁnition we must also have that wA = w(t).
22ˆ w, we can write:
wC = wA · e[ ˆ w·(tC−tA)] = wA · e[ ˆ w·Log(C/A)/ ˆ A] (25)
Substituting (25) and (23) into (24), we immediately ﬁnd the demand for
labour for intermediate with index C:
j(t)(tC + s) = L · [w(t)/π(s,)α]
−σ · α2σ · e−σ· ˆ w·[s+Log(C/A)/ ˆ A] (26)
We see from (26) that the demand for labour during the training phase
depends negatively on the duration of the training period s. It also depends
negatively on the time of arrival of an intermediate (recall from (23) that
tC = Log(C)/ ˆ A): the younger it is, the further away in the future the train-
ing phase will be, and for growing wages, the lower will be the corresponding
demand for labour.
Given (26), the steady-state total demand for labour associated with all
intermediates in the training phase can be obtained by direct integration
over all intermediates in the training phase, where it should be noted that
π(s,) depends on ϕ and ψ through (4) and (2):
T(t) =
R A(t)
B(t) j(t)(tC + s)dtC =
A(t)·e(− ˆ A·s)· ˆ A·L·π(s,)ασ·w(t)−σ·α2σ·(1−α)·(es·( ˆ A−σ· ˆ w)−1)
ˆ A/σ− ˆ w
(27)
Both the numerator and the denominator of (27) will approach zero in
the steady state because of the presence of the terms ˆ A/σ− ˆ w and ˆ A−σ· ˆ w
and because (22) should hold in the steady state. Consequently, we need to
apply l’Hopital’s rule to (27) to ﬁnd:
T(t) = A(t) · e− ˆ A·s · ˆ A · L · π(s,)ασ · w(t)−σ · α2σ · s (28)
Using(21) and (28) to obtain the steady state ratio J/T, we ﬁnd that:
J(t)/T(t) = 1/(s · ˆ A) (29)
From (29) it follows immediately that the number of workers in the pro-
duction phase relative to the number of workers in the training phase falls
if the duration of the training period increases, while it also falls if the rate
of technical change increases. The latter is easy to understand, since the
share of the number of intermediates in the training phase must increase
if A increases. Consequently, more people will receive training in times of
23faster technical change. Substituting (29) into (11), we ﬁnd for the steady
state values of J and T that:
J∗ = Hp/(1 + s · ˆ A) (30a)
T∗ = Hp · s · ˆ A/(1 + s · ˆ A) (30b)
It should be noted from (30a) and (30b) that an increase in the duration
of training would increase T∗ while decreasing J∗, ceteris paribus.
Finally, by adding (21) and (28) together, we obtain the total demand for
labour by the intermediate goods sector. We can invert that relation to get
the equilibrium wage rate that would clear the market for total production
labour both in the training and the production phase:
w(t) =
"





We see that in the steady state, in which HP would be constant, the
growth rate of wages would still be given by (22). We also see that an
increase in the availability of production labour would depress wages, as
expected. At this stage a deeper analysis is not possible since s itself, but
also ˆ A itself depends (non-linearly) on wages and wage growth. However,
in section 4 we will use (31) as part of a system of simultaneous relations
to ﬁnd out about the connection between education, on-the-job training,
technology adoption, production and the rate of innovation at the aggregate
level. Before doing that, however, we must describe the demand for R&D
labour.
3.4.7 The R&D Sector
As in the Romer (1990) model, we assume that a new intermediate input
is produced in accordance with the newest blueprint coming from the R&D
sector. As stated before, A(t) is the index of the newest technology available
to the market at time t. It therefore also represents the total number of




= δ ·  · HR · A (32)
where we have included human capital per head  as a determinant of R&D
productivity. It follows that the growth rate of A will directly depend on the
24education decisions taken by households through the presence of . However,
as stated before, in taking these decisions, households do not take this fully
into account.
Assuming, as Romer does, that the present value of the expected quasi-
rents can be captured by the blueprint producers, and that R&D wages
equal the marginal beneﬁts from hiring an additional R&D worker, we ﬁnd




· Q = Q · A · δ ·  (33)
Substituting (17) for Q as well as (18) for all the intermediates that are
in the production phase10, we ﬁnd a complicated expression for the wage
rate for R&D workers that depends on the wage rate of production workers.
Since labour market arbitrage ensures that wR = w at all times, we can
combine (31) and (33) to obtain the equilibrium value of HP as a function
of all the variables and parameters of the model, for which wages for the
high-skilled workers earned in both their uses (as R&D and as production
workers) are equal. As the expression is still rather complicated, and includes
terms containing ˆ A, it is not reproduced here. However, this expression for
HP can now be used to obtain an implicit equation for ˆ A, since we must
have from (10), (11) and (32) that:
ˆ A = [(1 − ϕ − ψ) · H − HP] · δ ·  (34)
Equation (34) provides a compressed description of the supply-side of
the growth model. Combining it with the growth demand side as given
by (8c) in combination with the steady state requirement that ˆ c = ˆ Y , we
can now obtain an impression of the working of the model by means of
some numerical simulations. By numerically solving (34), we can readily
’de-construct’ the underlying values of the allocation of time over its various
uses. The outcomes of this deconstruction process are described in more
detail in the next session.




In this section we present two kinds of outcomes. In section 4.2 we show
some of the results that we have generated as part of a sensitivity analysis
regarding the calculation of the net present value of the quasi-rents and the
corresponding optimum length of the training period.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
By substituting all our intermediate results into (17), we can obtain an ex-
pression for Q in terms of s, that, together with (19) would enable us to
solve both Q and s. Because of the strong non-linearity of this 2x2 equation
system, an analytical solution can unfortunately not be found. However,
we can get an impression of the sensitivity of the net present value of the
quasi-rents, i.e. Q, for changes in s by drawing Q as a function of s, for
given values of the parameters. These ’base-run’ parameter values are given
in Table 1 further below.
It should be noted that equation (17) contains (endogenous) variables
that are given from the point of view of the individual entrepreneur, but
that will change endogenously over time in the full model that we will sim-
ulate later on. Presently, we are only concerned with showing that the
speciﬁcations we have chosen for the production structure and the produc-
tivity function ensure that there is indeed an optimum amount of on the job
training that depends in an intuitive way on the parameters listed in the
Table below. It should be noted that these parameter values are just some
’fake’ numbers not reﬂecting any empirical regularities, except for their signs.
Table 1: Base-Run Parameter Values
Par Value Par Value Par Value
α 0.500 ζ1 0.667 x 1.000
ˆ w 0.025 ζ2 0.033 w 1.000
ρ 0.075 γ0 0.500 ϕ 0.200
ζ0 2.000 γ1 0.500 ψ 0.100
In Table 1, ˆ w is the expected instantaneous growth rate of wages, whereas
26ρ is the rate of discount11. x is a scale factor for the demand for interme-
diates that will be modelled explicitly later on. For our present illustrative
purposes the only thing that is relevant is that it is a constant.
In Figure 2, the downward sloping curve is the one associated with ∂Q/∂s.
One observes that for the speciﬁc parameter set chosen here, Q itself has a
maximum, but Q is relatively unresponsive to changes in s in the neighbor-
hood of that maximum. The maximum value of Q (0.84) is reached for a
value of s of 2.07.
Figure 2: Net Present Value Quasi-Rents
By changing the parameters underlying Q, we can ﬁnd out more about
the qualitative and quantitative behaviour of Q and the consequences for
the optimum value of s. In order to do this, we have increased each of the
parameters individually by 10% as compared to its base-run value12, and
then obtained the corresponding graph of Q. The shifts in the graph of Q
are a direct indication then of the partial derivatives of Q with respect to
the parameter under consideration for the entire range of values of s. But
rather than showing all the graphs associated with these partial derivatives,
we provide information in tabular form below in Table 213.
The columns with heading ’Par’ hold the names of the parameters we have
11Obviously, in the full simultaneous model, the expected growth rate of w will be an
endogenous variable. This also goes for ϕ and ψ.
12The sensitivity analysis has been carried out for ±1% and ±10% variations in the
parameters’ values. In the paper we report only the +10% case.
13In Table 2 a plus, a minus or zero sign implies that the partial derivative of either
the net present value of the quasi-rents or the length of the training period s is positive,
negative or zero.
27Table 2: Parameters Sensitivity
Par ∂Q/∂s ∂s/∂Par Par ∂Q/∂s ∂s/∂Par
α - - ζ2 - 0
ˆ w - - γ0 + 0
ρ - - γ1 - -
ζ0 + 0 x + 0
ζ1 - 0 w - 0
changed, while holding the other parameters constant. The other columns
hold information regarding the sign of the partial derivatives of Q and the
optimum value of s (hence the shift in the ∂Q/∂s curve) with respect to the
parameter under consideration.
Looking at the eﬀects of individual parameter changes, we see that an
increase in α implies an increase of the price-elasticity of demand. This in
turn lowers the proﬁt margin, hence proﬁts themselves, hence the present
value of the quasi-rents Q too. This will lower the optimum amount of train-
ing, as one would expect, ceteris paribus. An increase in the rate of discount
ρ has qualitatively the same eﬀects. The present value of the quasi-rents
is negatively aﬀected, and so is the optimum amount of training. A rise in
ζ0 has a positive eﬀect on Q, but no eﬀect on s. The latter also goes for
changes in ζ1 and ζ2 which is a result that can be analytically derived from
setting (17) equal to zero. A rise in γ1, i.e. the human capital elasticity
of labour eﬃciency, also reduces the training elasticity of labour eﬃciency.
We observe a net negative eﬀect, both on Q and on s, again as expected.
A change in the amount of formal education ϕ has a positive eﬀect on pro-
ductivity, hence on Q. This also goes for a rise in ψ. However, in both
cases s is not directly aﬀected. Nonetheless, since the latter ’parameters’
would also inﬂuence the growth rate of the economy, ceteris paribus, it is to
be expected that the general equilibrium eﬀect will be non-zero, as we will
show in the next section. A change in the growth rate of wages reduces Q. It
also reduces the optimum amount of training, since not only training costs
rise during the training phase, but in addition to this, quasi-rents during
the production phase will fall. Similar results can be observed for a rise
in the initial wage rate, except that a change in the initial wage-level does
not have an eﬀect on s. Finally, a rise in the autonomous demand for the
intermediate under consideration would raise Q but not s.
28Summarising the above, we have to make a distinction between parame-
ter changes that have a direct growth eﬀect, and so aﬀect the intertemporal
balancing of costs against beneﬁts. Changes in wage levels or the level of
autonomous demand do indeed have an impact on Q but not on s, whereas
this is distinctly diﬀerent for the growth parameters, like the growth rate of
wages or the rate of discount. A striking result is the insensitivity of s for
changes in the parameters associated with the education system. However,
these would directly aﬀect ϕ and ψ, and hence the growth rate of the econ-
omy, which in turn is an important determinant of Q and s again. Thus,
there will be a general equilibrium eﬀect that is not accounted for in this
sensitivity analysis.
4.3 Steady State General Equilibrium Results
The simultaneous model that we are going to solve numerically for the vari-
ables s, ˆ A,HR,J,T and ϕ consists of the following equations:
1. equation (22) that describes the link between technical change and
wage growth;
2. the implicit equation for production labour that we obtain from com-
bining (31) and (33);
3. equation (34) that describes the rate of technical change in function
of the level of production labour;
4. equations (30a) and (30b) that describe the shares of labour in the
production phase and labour in the training phase in total non R&D
production labour;
5. equation (19) that (implicitly) describes the optimum value of s;
6. equations (9a) and (9b) that describe the optimum allocation of time
to education and teaching;
7. the growth demand side of the model, linking the interest rate to the
growth rate, as given by (8c).
We now put the productivity parameter associated with the R&D produc-
tion function (32), i.e. δ, equal to 0.6, and the intertemporal elasticity of
29substitution 1/δ equal to 1.5. We then solve the model (excluding the equa-
tion for ϕ, i.e. (9.A)) for varying values of ϕ. We still have the same values
for the other structural parameters as given by Table 1, except for the rate
of discount that we have reduced to ρ = 0.03. However, the growth rate of
wages is now linked to the rate of technical change, while x, is given by the
parameter combination x = L · ασwith L = 1 (cf. equation (13)).
The way in which the equilibrium steady state growth rate ˆ Adepends
on the amount of education can now readily be observed by solving the si-
multaneous system outlined above, for all values 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. The result is
presented in Figure 3. In this ﬁgure, we ﬁnd two curves with an ’inverted’
U-shape. The solid curve is the one associated with a value of δ = 0.6,
whereas the dotted curve is associated with a value of δ = 0.7. The vertical
axis of Figure 3 below is associated with the growth rate of A, indicated
by GA. There is a solid vertical that represents the optimum value of ϕ as
given by (9.A). The point of intersection with the inverted U-shaped curves
deﬁnes the general equilibrium.
Figure 3: Growth as a function of education eﬀorts
Looking at this Figure, there are two main conclusions to be drawn. First
of all, the rate of technical change depends positively on the value of the
productivity parameter δ, since the dotted curve lies entirely above the solid
curve. Secondly, from a growth perspective, there seems to be an optimum
value of the level of education, since the growth curve reaches a deﬁnite
maximum for ϕ ≈ 0.22. The reason why the curve has an inverted U-shape
is the following: if an individual spends all his/her time at school, he can not
produce any output. If, on the contrary, an individual spends no time at all
at school, he does not get trained enough to produce; this follows immedi-
30ately from (34). We also conclude that the general equilibrium solution falls
short of the maximum growth solution, suggesting indeed that the amount
of general education that people obtain for themselves is too low.
In Figure 4, we have also plotted the corresponding graphs for the dura-
tion of training s.
Figure 4: The duration of training
This graph shows that for low levels of education, an increase in the level
of ϕ will be associated with a lower level of training, suggesting that training
and education act like substitutes. For high levels of ϕ, however, the amount
of training rises with the level of education itself, suggesting that education
and training act like complements. This result is consistent with the mixed
results we have found in the introductory part regarding the complemen-
tarity/substitutability of training and education in function of the level of
education. The substitutability of the two derives from the fact that on the
downward sloping part of the curve in Figure 4, the rate of technical change
is rising, as we can see from Figure 3, and therefore also the growth rate of
wages (cf. equation (22)).
Table 2, that contains our partial sensitivity results, shows that an in-
crease in the growth rate of wages reduces the optimum amount of training,
because proﬁt ﬂows are strongly eroded. On the downward sloping part
of the training duration curves above, the rise in the growth rate of wages
causes training levels to fall by more than the optimum amount of training
expands with an increase in the level of education. When the rate of techni-
cal change starts falling again after starts exceeding its growth maximising
value, the growth rate of the wage rate is reduced as well, and the partial
complementarity results become stronger again, resulting in the observed
positive correlation between education and training for higher levels of ed-
31ucation. Interestingly, this downward shift of the training duration curve
signals that in times of strong technical change, general education becomes a
relatively more important determinant of productivity than technology spe-
ciﬁc training, since for every level of general education, the optimum level
of training falls.
With respect to Figure 4, it should furthermore be noted that the gen-
eral equilibrium value of s is higher than the growth maximising value of s,
which is reached for exactly the same value of ϕ as the growth maximum
itself. So, not only does the general equilibrium generate a shortage of ed-
ucation, but it causes overinvestment in training as well, again emphasising
the substitutability of education and training.
Figure 5: R&D employment
Figure 5 shows how the number of R&D workers changes with the level of
education. Again, this is as expected: at ﬁrst the number of R&D workers
rises for an increase in the level of education, and then it falls when the
reduction in available hours per R&D worker falls below the increase in the
absolute productivity of that worker.
32Figure 6: Labour in the training phase
In Figure 6, we depict what happens to the number of workers in the
training phase. The results are very interesting on two accounts. First, an
increase in the productivity of R&D workers raises the number of produc-
tion workers in the training phase. This is consistent with the idea that
increased technical progress brings about stronger “creative wear and tear”
of technology-speciﬁc knowledge, requiring more people to be retrained. Sec-
ondly, the number of people in the training phase peaks at levels of education
that are somewhat lower than in the low productivity/growth case. This is
due to the fact that the strong upward pressure on wage growth for low but
growing levels of education have a strongly negative eﬀect on the duration
of training (see Figure 4) that leads to a fall in the number of people in the
training phase even before the peak in the rate of technical change itself has
been reached.
In Figure 7, we show that the number of people in the production phase
falls with a rise in the productivity of R&D labour. This is the corollary of
the rise of the number of people in the training phase. However, it is also
caused by the rise in the number of R&D workers.
Figure 7: Labour in the production phase
33To sum up then, faster technological change leads to higher growth in-
deed, but also to more people being (re-) trained for shorter periods of time.
Nonetheless, growth opportunities are left unused as private households fail
to take account of the growth impact of their education decisions.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model that combines private
household investment in education with investment by ﬁrms in workplace
training in a context of costly technology adoption and ’wear-and-tear’ cre-
ative destruction. Its aim is to answer the question how technological change
aﬀects the composition of human capital in terms of education and training.
In our set-up, time is the unit of measure of each activity. Its total
amount available can be spent for three diﬀerent purposes, i.e. the accumu-
lation of human capital, the production of goods and the production of new
technologies.
The accumulation of general knowledge occurs through schooling and
teaching, while its utilization occurs in goods production and in R&D.
The labour time available for the production of goods can be split in time-
consuming training activities, necessary for adopting the newest technolo-
gies, and current manufacturing of (intermediate) goods.
General knowledge is acquired within the educational system, where peo-
ple spend their time as pupils or in teaching activities. We assume that
teachers earn a competitive wage, covered from fees paid by private house-
holds. The latter are engaged in education with the aim of obtaining higher
future wages in the labour market through higher labour eﬃciency arising
from human capital accumulation. Technological knowledge is produced
through R&D and is embodied in new intermediates that are patented and
sold to ﬁnal good producers.
In line with R&D-based endogenous growth models, we assume that new
designs are the outcome of the time spent in research activities and the
amount of education acquired by R&D workers. Finally, knowledge is used
at the plant level for the production of intermediate goods: however, the
arrival of a new intermediate requires workers to learn how to produce that
intermediate eﬀectively, and this occurs through a time-consuming on-the-
job training activity that is entirely ﬁnanced by the ﬁrm.
34In our model, education pervades the entire economy and plays three
roles: from the consumers’ point of view, more education means higher
future labour earnings due to the higher trainability and labour eﬃciency
of individuals; from the R&D point of view, more education means higher
numbers of new technologies produced in research labs, and then faster tech-
nological change; ﬁnally, from the point of view of the ﬁrm, more education
means lower training costs, and thus the possibility to adopt new technolo-
gies sooner in time, thus bringing sales forward in time.
Our partial equilibrium simulation results show that, generally speaking,
both the net present value of the quasi-rents themselves, and the optimum
duration of the training phase react to parameter changes that would aﬀect
the intertemporal distribution of costs and beneﬁts. We also ﬁnd that the
parameters of the educational system do not aﬀect optimum training period
choices, even though they do aﬀect the net present value of the quasi-rents.
However, in a general equilibrium situation this is completely diﬀerent, since
in that case such parameter changes would have a direct impact on the pro-
ductivity of R&D workers, hence on growth and therefore on the growth of
wages too, and hence on training decisions again. In that case we ﬁnd that
more technical change would lead to less training.
We extend the analysis to a general equilibrium setting, in which we in-
troduce both the households’ educational choices - that are merely driven by
the possibility to reap higher future wage rates - and the level of education
as a factor that determines the productivity of R&D workers as well as that
of high-skilled production workers. Thus we obtain a bell-shaped relation-
ship between the rate of technical change and the level of education, since
time spent in the education system cannot be utilized either for ﬁnal good
production or for new technology production. This means that, on the one
hand, it is possible to derive an optimum amount of education that maxi-
mizes the rate of technological change, while on the other hand, too much
time spent in acquiring knowledge, or teaching, at school reduces the time
available for production activities, thereby reducing the time and ﬁnancial
resources available for the production of future innovations. Moreover, an
increase in the rate of technological change shifts the curve upwards while
leaving the growth maximizing level of education unchanged.
Nonetheless, the duration of training decreases, whereas the number of
people in the training phase increases. So the eﬀect of a rise in research
35labour productivity is to (re-) train more people for shorter periods of
time. This ﬁnding does conﬁrm the available evidence that emphasizes the
training-enhancing nature of technology, even though it is unclear a priori
whether and how the total volume of training is aﬀected.
Interestingly, when we include households education decisions in the
analysis, we see that the optimum private level of educational time, which
is driven by their wish to earn higher future wages, is strictly below the
growth maximising amount of education time: from a growth perspective,
therefore, households tend to under-invest in education. Similar results
emerge when we look at the general equilibrium relationship between ed-
ucation and workplace training. In this case we ﬁnd that the observational
complementarity between the duration of education and training turns into
a U-shaped relationship, indicating observational substitutability for low
levels of education-time and complementarity for higher levels of education-
time. This observational substitutability arises from a general equilibrium
eﬀect that pushes up wages as the rise in the time devoted to education
raises the growth rate of the economy and hence the demand for production
labour. This reduces the optimum duration of training, as was shown in the
parameter sensitivity results.
We also observe that this U-shaped curve shifts downward in the train-
ing and education-plane when technological change speeds up, thus changing
the human capital composition of the workforce in favour of general edu-
cation. Because a higher rate of innovation increases the number of people
being (re-) trained, the number of workers available for direct production
decreases, since the number of R&D workers increases. Nonetheless, output
grows faster than before, because of the ’Love of Variety’ eﬀect.
With respect to households’ education decisions, we ﬁnd that the pri-
vately optimal level of training is higher than the growth maximising level
of training, suggesting that households do not invest enough to minimize
ﬁrms’ training costs, thus forcing producers to provide more training than
it would be necessary for maximizing growth. A change in education fees
may change the level of education such that training costs are reduced by
more than training fees are lowered for households. At the moment, this is
left for future research.
Rounding up, our model shows that in times of increasing technical
change, the optimum ’portfolio-mix’ between education and training changes
36in favour of the former, since that provides a relatively solid basis for the
development of technology- speciﬁc skills that are prone to creative destruc-
tion. However, when we endogenize education costs, we see that private
households’ decisions regarding education seem to leave growth opportuni-
ties and training cost reductions unexploited, thus ’calling out’ for public
policy intervention.
References
Acemoglu, D. (1997): “Training and innovation in an imperfect labour
market,” Review of Economic Studies, 64, 445–464.
(1998): “Why do new technologies complement skills? Direct tech-
nical change and wage inequality,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113(4), 1055–1090.
(2002): “Technical change, inequality, and the labor market,” Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 40, 7–72.
Acemoglu, D., and J.-S. Pischke (1999): “Beyond Becker: training in
imperfect labour markets,” The Economic Journal, 109, F112–F142.
Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992): “A model of growth through creative
destruction,” Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351.
Aghion, P., P. Howitt, and G. L. Violante (2002): “General purpose
technology and wage inequality,” Journal of Economic Growth, 7, 315–
345.
Allen, J., and R. K. V. der Velden (2001): “Educational mismatches
versus skill mismatches: eﬀects on wages, job satisfaction, and on-the-job
search,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 434–452.
Arrow, K. J. (1962): “The economic implications of learning by doing,”
Review of Economic Studies, 24(3), 155–173.
Autor, D. H., L. F. Katz, and A. B. Krueger (1998): “Computing
inequality: have computers changed the labor market?,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 113(4), 1169–1213.
37Autor, D. H., F. Levy, and R. J. Murnane (2003): “The skill content
of recent technological change: an empirical investigation,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 9, 1279–1333.
Bartel, A. P., and F. R. Lichtenberg (1987): “The comparative ad-
vantage of educated workers in implementing new technology,” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 16(4), 718–755.
Bartel, A. P., and N. Sicherman (1998): “Technological change and the
skill acquisition of young workers,” Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4),
718–755.
Berman, E., J. Bound, and Z. Griliches (1994): “Changes in the de-
mand for skilled labour within US manufacturing: evidence from the An-
nual Surveyof Manufacturers,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109,
367–397.
Berndt, E. R., C. J. Morrison, and L. S. Resenblum (1992): “High-
tech capital formation and labor composition in US manufacturing indus-
tries: an exploratory analysis,” Working Paper 4010, NBER, Cambridge,
MA.
Bessen, J. (2002): “Technology adoption costs and productivity growth:
the transition to information technology,” Review of Economic Dynamics,
5, 443–469.
Bresnahan, T. F., E. Brynjolfsson, and L. M. Hitt (2002): “In-
formation technology, workplace organization and the demand for skilled
labour: ﬁrm level evidence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1),
339–376.
Brunello, G. (2001): “On the complementarity of education and training
in Europe,” Discussion Paper 309, IZA, Bonn.
Brynjolfsson, E., and L. M. Hitt (2000): “Beyond computation: in-
formation technology, organizational transformation and business perfor-
mance,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(4), 23–48.
Caselli, F. (1999): “Technological Revolutions,” The American Economic
Review, 89(1), 78–102.
38Doms, M., T. Dunne, and K. R. Troske (1997): “Workers, wages, and
technology,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 253–290.
Dunne, T., J. C. Haltiwanger, and K. R. Troske (1997): “Technology
and jobs: secular changes and cyclical dynamics,” Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 46, 107–178.
Dunne, T., and J. A. J. Schmitz (1995): “Wages, employment struc-
ture and employer size-wage premia: their relationship to advanced-
technology usage at US manufacturing establishments,” Economica, New
Series, 62(245), 89–107.
Dunne, T., and K. R. Troske (2005): “Technology adoption and the skill
mix of US manufacturing plants,” Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
52(3), 387–405.
Entorf, H., and F. Kramarz (1997): “Does unmeasured ability explain
the higher wages of new technology workers?,” European Economic Re-
view, 41, 1489–1509.
Galia, F., and D. Legros (2004): “Research and development, innova-
tion, training, quality and proﬁtability: evidence from France,” Discussion
paper, ERMES-CNRS, Universit´ e Panth´ eon, Assas Paris II.
Galor, O., and O. Moav (2000): “Ability-biased technological transi-
tion, wage inequality, and economic growth,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, X, 469–497.
Gill, I. (1988): “Technological change, education and obsolescence of hu-
man capital,” paper presented for the NBER Summer Institute.
Goldin, C., and L. F. Katz (1998): “The origins of technology-skill com-
plementarity,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 693–732.
(2007): “The race between education and technology: the evolu-
tion of U.S. educational wage diﬀerentials, 1890 to 2005,” Working Paper
12984, NBER, Cambridge (MA).
Gould, E. D. (2002): “Rising wage inequality, comparative advantage, and
the growing importance of generic skills in the United States,” Journal of
Labor Economics, 20(1), 105–147.
39Gould, E. D., O. Moav, and B. A. Weinberg (2001): “Precautionary
demand for education, inequality, and technological progress,” Journal of
Economic Growth, 6, 285–315.
Green, F. G., D. Ashton, and A. Felstead (2001): “Estimating the
determinants of supply of computing, problem-solving, communication,
social, and teamworking skills,” Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 406–433.
Greenwood, J., and M. Yorukoglu (1997): “1974,” Carnegie-Rochester
Conference Series on Public Policy, 46, 49–95.
Grossman, G., and E. Helpman (1991): Innovation and growth in a
global economy. MIT Press, Cambridge (MA).
Haskel, J., and Y. Heden (1999): “Computers and the demand for skilled
labour: industry- and establishment-level panel evidence for the UK,” The
Economic Journal, 109(454), C68–C79.
Heijke, H., C. Meng, and C. Ris (2003): “Fitting to the job: the role
of generic and vocational competencies in adjustment and performance,”
Labour Economics, 10, 215–229.
Helpman, E., and A. Rangel (1999): “Adjusting mto a new technology:
experience and training,” Journal of Economic Growth, 4, 359–383.
Jovanovic, B., and Y. Nyarko (1996): “Learning by doing and the choice
of technology,” Econometrica, 64(6), 1299–1310.
Juhn, C., K. M. Murphy, and B. Pierce (1993): “Wage inequality and
the rise in returns to skill,” The Journal of Political Economy, 101(3),
410–442.
Killingsworth, M. R. (1982): “”Learning by doing” and ”investment in
training”: a synthesis of two ”rival” models of life cycle,” The Review of
Economic Studies, 49(2), 263–271.
Krueger, D., and K. B. Kumar (2004): “Skill-speciﬁc rather than gen-
eral education: a reson for US-Europe growth diﬀerences?,” Journal of
Economic Growth, 9(2), 167–207.
Lillard, L. A., and H. W. Tan (1986): “Private sector training: who
gets it and what are its eﬀects,” Discussion Paper R-3331-DOL, Rand
Corporation.
40Lindbeck, A., and D. J. Snower (2000b): “Multitask learning and the
reorganization of work: from Tayloristic to Holistic organization,” Journal
of Labor Economics, 18(3), 353–376.
Lloyd-Ellis, H. (1999): “Endogenous technological change and wage in-
equality,” The American Economic Review, 89(1), 47–77.
Mincer, J. (1989): “Human capital responses to technological change in
the labour market,” in Studies in human capital, ed. by J. M. (1993),
vol. 1. Edward Elgar.
Murnane, R. J., J. B. Willet, and F. Levy (1995): “The growing im-
portance of cognitive skills in wage determination,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 77(2), 251–266.
Nelson, R. R., and E. S. Phelps (1966): “Investment in humans, techno-
logical diﬀusion, and economic growth,” The American Economic Review,
56(2), 69–75.
OECD (2000): Employment Outlook 1999. OECD, Paris.
Ramsey, F. (1928): “A mathematical theory of saving,” Economic Journal,
38, 543–559.
Rivera-Batiz, L., and P. M. Romer (1991): “Economic integration and
endogenous growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2), 531–
555.
Romer, P. M. (1990): “Endogenous technological change,” Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 98(5), S71–S102.
Rosen, S. (1972): “Learning by experience as joint production,” The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 86(3), 366–382.
Spitz, A. (2003): “IT capital, job content and educational attainment,”
Discussion Paper 03-04, ZEW.
Stasz, C. (2001): “Assessing skills for work: two perspectives,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 3, 385–405.
Tan, H. (1989): “Technical change and its consequences for training and
earnings,” Unpublished Manuscript, RAND (CA).
41van Smoorenburg, M., and R. van der Velden (2000): “The train-
ing of school leavers. Complementarity or substitution?,” Economics of
Education Review, 19, 207–217.
VanZon, A., and I. H. Yetkiner (2003): “An endogenous growth model
with embodied energy-saving technical change,” Resource and Energy
Economics, 25, 81–103.
Violante, G. L. (2002): “Technological acceleration, skill transferability,
and the rise in residual inequality,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
10, 297–338.
Weinberg, B. A. (2004): “Experience and technology adoption,” Discus-
sion Paper 1051, IZA.
Welch, F. (1970): “Education in production,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 78(1), 35–59.
42